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Abstract concepts such as Islamophobia invite operational definitions that prescribe courses of inquiry that eschew the 
abstract in favor of the concrete. Ideally, such inquiry renders a concept more intelligible by providing conceptual clarity 
and by prescribing a research agenda. In our view, inquiries regarding Islamophobia should confront 1) how Muslims are 




As Nietzsche quipped, Philosophy is self-con-
fession.1 When we started this project, we 
thought we would develop an integrated the-
ory of Islamophobia. We assumed (or hoped) 
that our theory would be simple, elegant, with 
systematically interconnected elements—an 
aid to understanding, predicting, and over-
coming Islamophobia. Considerable conversa-
tion and reflection revealed we were woefully 
unprepared to undertake the task. Simply put: 
We weren’t sure what we were talking about. 
Islamophobia is one of those nettlesome, ab-
stract nouns: Everyone knows what it means—
till he or she is asked to define it. Scholars 
weren’t always helpful; they heeded their call-
ing by disputing contested definitions.
The unsettled nature of Islamophobia is no sur-
prise. It’s an ambiguous concept, not a thing 
like a  tree. Accordingly, we had no illusions 
about getting it right by devising what philoso-
pher Richard Rorty called a “final vocabulary”—
the last word on a definition.2 Islamophobia 
is not an obdurate thing found in nature, an 
object with precisely definable boundaries 
that persist regardless of time and place. It’s a 
1. Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to 
a Future Philosophy,” trans. Ian Johnston, Prelude to a Fu-
ture Philosophy, by Friedrich Nietzsche, The University of 
Adelaide Library, 6 Mar. 2014, ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/n/ni-
etzsche/friedrich/n67b/index.html.
2. Richard Rorty, “Ironists and Metaphysicians,” in The Truth 
about the Truth, Walter Truett Anderson, ed. (New York: 
Putnam, 1995), 101-02.
product of the imagination, an all-too-human 
invention. 
Abstract concepts such as Islamophobia invite 
operational definitions that prescribe courses 
of inquiry that eschew the abstract in favor 
of the concrete. Ideally, such inquiry renders 
a concept more intelligible by providing con-
ceptual clarity and by prescribing a research 
agenda. In our view, inquiries regarding Is-
lamophobia should confront the following 
research agenda:
 • Islamophobia is ambiguous, but it is 
not bereft of meaning. It obviously re-
fers to Muslims or Islamic doctrines; but 
how are Muslims or Islamic doctrines 
identified—or misidentified? Lacking 
a clear understanding of Muslim iden-
tity, are certain beliefs and attitudes 
towards Muslims misguided regarding 
Muslim identity? Islam is a worldwide 
religion with followers from many races 
and nationalities; however, the public 
tends to equate Islam with the Arab 
world. The evidence suggests that, to 
many people in the United States, all 
Muslims are Arabs and all Arabs are 
Muslims.3 The two seem inseparable in 
the popular imagination. Therefore, any 
action taken by an Arab nation or an 
individual of Arab descent is assumed 
to be motivated by an adherence to 
3. See Julita, “Difference Between Muslims and Arabs,” Dif-
ference Between, Sept. 27, 2017, http://www.differenceb-
etween.net/miscellaneous/difference-between-mus-
lims-and-arabs/.
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Islam. This confusion has led to the 
projection of anti-Islamic attitudes 
towards all Arabs—or anyone who 
resembles an Arab in the popular 
imagination.4  Likewise, when non-
Muslim Arabs commit acts deemed 
unacceptable in the West, the animus 
towards those actors is directed 
toward all Muslims. Therefore, negative 
attitudes towards Muslims might better 
be described as negative attitudes 
towards Arabs.
 • Is Islamophobia simply a phobia—
when a phobia is understood as an ir-
rational fear? Or, is it also a prejudice—
an unfavorable bias against a group? 
Could it be both? Phobia and prejudice 
are often conflated, but they’re not syn-
onymous. Consider: One can harbor 
prejudices (a priori biases) against old 
women but not fear them. Our analy-
sis suggests that Islamophobia is both 
a prejudice and a phobia. Could it be 
that, in both its ordinary and technical 
usage, prejudice is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the phobia. 
The prejudice—stemming from, and 
aptly labeled “Orientalism” by literary 
scholar Edward Said—literally emerg-
es from prejudging those perceived as 
Arabs. The judgment is seldom based 
upon personal experience. Instead, it is 
a social/cultural construction amplified 
and reinforced by the media. There-
fore, any account of Islamophobia must 
take these constructions into account. 
9/11 was not—and is not—represented 
as an episode perpetrated by a small 
cabal of fanatics, fanatics denounced 
time and again by mainstream Muslim 
clerics and scholars. On the contrary, 
violent actions are deemed endemic 
to the theory and practice of Islam—a 
4. For example, Sikhs have been murdered in their tem-
ple; Steven Yaccino et al., “Gunman Kills 6 at a Sikh Tem-
ple Near Milwaukee,” The New York Times, Aug. 5, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/us/shooting-report-
ed-at-temple-in-wisconsin.html; and an Italian mathema-
tician was removed from a plane; David Millward, “Italian 
Mathematician Taken Off Flight After Fellow Passenger 
Alarmed by His Notepad Calculations,” The Telegraph, 
May. 7, 2016, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/07/
italian-mathematician-taken-off-flight-after-fellow-pas-
senger-al/.
veritable credo, the theme of the faith. 
By way of stark contrast, the violent acts 
of non-Muslims are deemed episodic. 
For example, a non-Muslim shooter 
on the Strip in Las Vegas is viewed as 
a lone wolf, a madman compelled to 
act violently due to opaque mental 
infirmities—an anomalous event. 
(The shooter’s brain was analyzed at a 
Stanford University laboratory.)5 Howev-
er, a lone disturbed Muslim committing 
the same act in an Orlando nightclub 
doesn’t prompt a comparable forensic 
investigation. Turning to the prejudicial 
dimension of Islamophobia, it is pre-
supposed that violent acts committed 
by Muslims are not anomalous; on the 
contrary, such acts are viewed as part of 
a worldwide Islamic terrorist conspira-
cy—a recurrent theme. 
 • To paraphrase Nietzsche once again, 
concepts with a history cannot be de-
fined; they must be narrated. Return-
ing to the example above, a tree can be 
understood without telling its story. Is-
lamophobia must be narrated—a story 
that scripts the transition from benign 
Orientalism to the current form of ma-
lign Orientalism—the signature of pre-
vailing media constructions. The public 
perception of Muslims has changed 
drastically in recent years. As we have 
argued earlier, many people equate 
Muslims with Arabs. The traditional im-
age of an Arab was a Disney-type char-
acter emerging from a bottle wafting 
on a flying carpet amid exotic bazars 
and jeweled palaces. The modern im-
age of Muslims—especially Arab men—
is, to understate the case, more sinister: 
“Arab men surface as villains: Bedouin 
bandits, sinister sheikhs, buffoons, and 
gun wielding terrorists.”6 However, ap-
parently, the stereotypical Arab woman 
persists: “As a rule, Arab women are still 
projected as mostly mute and submis-
5. Jose Antonio Avalos, “School of Medicine to Study Brain 
Tissue of Vegas Shooter,” The Stanford Daily, Oct. 23, 2017, 
https://www.stanforddaily.com/2017/10/23/stanford-to-
study-brain-tissue-of-vegas-shooter/. 
6. Jack Shaheen, “Entertainment Industries Can Chang-
es Negative Stereotypes,” The National, Sept. 29, 
2013,  https://www.thenational.ae/entertainment-indus-
tries-can-change-negative-stereotypes-1.448135.
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sive figures: bundles in black, beasts of 
burden, exotic belly dancers, and even 
bombers.”7  A working definition of 
Islamophobia invites inquiry regarding 
the factors that precipitated this 
sea change from benign to malign 
Orientalism. In our view, psychological, 
sociological, and economic factors play 
a determinative role; these factors are 
seen writ large in media studies. 
2. Psychological Considerations
Human behavior sometimes seems strange, 
but it is not ineffable. Indeed, it is often pre-
dictable. A working definition of Islamophobia 
provides a space for the psychological study 
of anti-Muslim prejudice and fear. This is not 
the place to list all the possible explanations 
of human behavior, but two come to mind: 
the works of Gordon Allport and theories of 
Sigmund Freud. 
Allport prompts inquiry into the origin and na-
ture of prejudice. In his seminal work, The Na-
ture of Prejudice, Allport argues that prejudice 
stems from stereotyping particular groups.8 
Stereotypes develop because the human brain 
seeks easy ways to make sense of the constant 
barrage of stimuli it receives. It is difficult for 
the brain to take in and process individual ac-
tions daily. Thus, it seeks to compartmentalize, 
and therefore generalize, its responses. This 
process of generalization forms the core of 
stereotypes. Rather than attempting to explain 
individual stimuli in specific contexts, the brain 
relies upon previous conceptions of stimuli 
(e.g., thoughts, tastes, or emotions) to explain 
new experiences. 
Let us consider the following scenario: a dog 
runs at us. If we don’t know the dog, never had 
a dog, but perhaps heard that dogs have a ten-
dency to bite humans, we may decide to run in 
fear—though the dog may want nothing more 
than affection. Put another way, simplicity in 
thinking produces stereotypes, and stereo-
types, left unquestioned, produce prejudice. 
7. Jack Shaheen, “Entertainment Industries Can Chang-
es Negative Stereotypes,” The National, Sept. 29, 
2013,  https://www.thenational.ae/entertainment-indus-
tries-can-change-negative-stereotypes-1.448135.
8. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice  (Boston: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979).
Psychological causes for anti-Muslim prejudice 
are numerous and complex. Like other preju-
dices, we contend that fear of the Other plays a 
significant role in this type of prejudice. Given 
that mass Muslim migration into the United 
States is a fairly recent phenomenon—large in-
fluxes of migrants from Muslim-majority coun-
tries took place in the 1960s—most American’s 
haven’t been exposed personally to Muslims 
as friends, coworkers, and so on. Like other 
immigrant groups, Muslim immigrants initially 
gravitated to small, tightknit communities of 
other Muslims in order to preserve their iden-
tity. Often, Islamic centers or mosques became 
central gathering places within these commu-
nities. Islamic centers are more than places of 
worship, they provide basic Islamic education 
for children, as well as places for celebrations, 
funerals, and social assistance programs, but, 
most importantly, these places are centers of 
acculturation and identity formation. Howev-
er, due to their insular nature, Islamic centers 
rarely engaged with civic society beyond their 
fences, preferring to focus internally in order to 
build strong Muslim identities and networks. 
Eventually, this insular approach increased the 
fear and mistrust of this newly arrived group 
among the existing population. 
Interactions between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims remain limited. Shrouded in mystery, 
this group became a screen for projecting 
uninformed stereotypes. Stereotypes—to un-
derstate the case—shifted from benign to ma-
lign in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. Muslims 
became the official Other in the United States 
and abroad. Depictions of Muslims perpetu-
ated notions of dangerousness and incom-
patibility with mainstream American—and 
Western—society. This led to the formation of 
policies that treat Muslims with suspicion and 
further engraved in the Western mind that 
Muslims are dangerous, they are unlike us!
And what would psychological inquiry be 
without reference to Freud, the Father of Psy-
choanalysis, who casts events in a new and dis-
turbing light? Turning to everyday discourse, a 
vital venue for Freudian inquiry, pundits have 
long quipped that 9/11 was uncanny. For Freud, 
quips can be redolent with meaning. Ever at-
tentive to paradox, he suggested that uncanny 
vexation occurs when one is thrown into a 
world at once menacingly alien (unheimlich—
Asfari, Hirschbein, and Larkin   PPJ 2.1 (2019)     4
not at home) yet  disturbingly familiar. In the 
aftermath of 9/11, many Americans no longer 
felt at home in their homeland. Even so, un-
canny dread is not solely the product of the 
alien or unknown. Sudden immersion in the 
unknown unleashes long-forgotten terror—a 
painfully familiar terror that bedevils our es-
trangement.9 As far as we know, Freud was the 
first to suggest that the uncanny brings to light 
what should have remained hidden—long-
forgotten childhood terrors that came by night 
in darkness and febrile dreams.10  The present 
became a foreign country on 9/11, reigniting 
smoldering childhood terror that should have 
remained hidden. No wonder pundits warn of 
“the Arab bogeyman.”11 To sum up a Freudian 
analysis, Americans lived through an event 
(9/11) that should have never taken place. After 
all, in America, mass casualties and destruction 
aren’t the norm—we’re not a developing na-
tion. As such, Americans felt uneasy about their 
new reality, and, gripped by fear, they needed 
two things to survive: (1) a common enemy to 
unite them, and (2) a strong leader (a parent 
figure) to shelter them, and to normalize their 
existence—to “Make America Great Again.”
3. Sociological Considerations
Group dynamics are another source of in-
creased anti-Muslim prejudice. In the Europe-
an context, Muslim-majority nations are close 
neighbors, but they are often viewed with 
hostility given the historical tumult between 
Christendom and Islam, reaching back to the 
Crusades. Contemporary prejudice against 
Muslims in Europe stems from the influx of 
Muslim immigrants, often due to the geopolit-
ical problems in the MENA (Middle East, North 
9. Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, trans. David McClintock 
(New York: Penguin, 2003), 149.
10. See Nicolas Royle’s discussion in The Uncan-
ny (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 24.
11. See, for example, “The Muslim Brotherhood Bogey 
Man,” The Huffington Post, accessed Dec. 26, 2016, http://
huffingtonpost.com/scot-atran-muslim-bogey-men-
egyp_b_817988.html; Khalded Abou El Fadl, “How Ha-
tred of Islam is Corrupting American’s Soul,” Religion and 
Ethics, Jan. 19, 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/arti-
cles/2017/01/18/4606049.htm. and Georgi Ivanov, “Wanted: 
A New Bogeyman”; Matthew Harwood, “Terrorism’s New 
Boogeyman: Charles Krauthammer and the Toxic Myth 




Africa) regions. As war continues unabated in 
many Muslim-majority countries (e.g., Syria 
and Yemen), many residents are fleeing to 
neighboring Europe. Subsequently, the influx 
of these refugees and migrants into European 
nations is causing a great deal of perceived 
threat among the local populations—the 
sudden shift in demographics is unnerving. 
Notable among these threats is the threat of 
displacement, the perception that the incom-
ing people will overrun the European countries 
and alter “European identity.” 
To best explain Islamophobia, we turn our at-
tention to functionalism, a view of identity, such 
as race and ethnicity, as being functional and 
contributing to stability within diverse-group 
dynamics.12 In the context of prejudice studies, 
groups identities functions as markers and en-
able the powerful group, often the dominant 
group in a society, to exclude those deemed 
different or threatening. Specifically, we exam-
ine the role of conflict theories in the creation 
of anti-Muslim prejudice. Conflict theories are 
intersectional, examining the role of race, eth-
nicity, sexual orientation, religion, and class as 
they combine to produce prejudice. Because 
Muslims are a religious group, drawing from 
many ethnicities and economic backgrounds, 
we contend that one way to marginalize them 
is through racializing them—a process compa-
rable to nineteenth-century European efforts 
to racialize Jews, turning an otherwise hetero-
geneous group into a monolithic one.13 If Jew-
ishness were viewed as a religious marker, the 
Jew can convert, and therefore escape the forc-
es of social exclusion, if not extermination. But, 
a Jew cannot escape his or her identity if it is 
deemed a racial characteristic. Similarly, recent 
attempts to racialize Muslims have taken place 
in the United States and elsewhere. Coupled 
with the homogenizing and dehumanization 
processes, policies of exclusion can be succinct 
and powerful at attaining their objectives. 
12. See, for example, John J. Macionis, “Sociological Theories 
of Prejudice and Racism,” Sociology Guide, http://www.so-
ciologyguide.com/ethnicity/sociological-theories-of-preju-
dice-and-racism.php.
13. Amin Asfari and Ron Hirschbein, “Two Semites Confront 
Anti-Semitism: On the Varieties of Anti-Semitic Experi-
ence,” in Peace, Culture, and Violence, ed. Fuat Gursozlu 
(Leiden: Brill, 2018), 106-25.
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4. Economic Factors and Mass 
Media
No discussion of exclusion can be satisfied 
without asking “Who benefits?” Opportunis-
tic politicians and the popular media find it 
advantageous to exaggerate and to sensa-
tionalize the domestic threat of Arab jihadists. 
Never mind that highly respected mainstream 
sources time-and-again demonstrate that 
the undersized reality of the threat. Testifying 
before congress, the RAND Corporations’ ter-
rorism expert, Brian Jenkins, concluded that, 
in the aftermath of 9/11, “The data show that 
the terrorist threat has been diminished, if not 
eliminated, and the level of risk to individual 
citizens is minuscule. . . . Only a tiny fraction 
of the total volume of criminal violence in the 
United States.” Jenkins determines that jihad-
ists have been responsible for 89 domestic fa-
talities since 9/11 as of January 2017.14 (Imagine 
the elation had there been just 89 gun-related 
homicides in this period.) Reality, however, 
detracts not at all from the sum of all uncanny 
fears.
Detailed information can be found in a 2011 
report by the Center for American Progress 
titled “Fear Inc.: The Roots of the Islamopho-
bia Network in America,” which reveals that 
anti-Muslim hate has been lucrative for those 
who indulge. The report identifies major do-
nors to the cause of Islamophobia, as well as 
misinformation “experts,” grassroots organiza-
tions, media enablers, and political players who 
all participate in, and benefit from, spreading 
misinformation and hate toward Islam and 
Muslims.15 
The spreading of misinformation is necessary 
to justify policies of exclusion. Homeland secu-
rity policies that overwhelmingly treat Muslims 
as potential threats and perpetrators of crime, 
while often ignoring more widespread and 
formidable forms of domestic extremism,16 do 
14. Brian Michael Jenkins, Fifteen Years After 9/11: A Prelimi-
nary Balance Sheet (Rand: Santa Monica, 2017), 2-3.
15. Wajahat Ali et al., “Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islam-
ophobia Network in America,” The Center for American 
Progress, Aug. 26, 2011, https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/religion/reports/2011/08/26/10165/fear-inc/.
16. See, for example, Kimberly Kindy, et al., “Federal Gov-
ernment has Long Ignored White Supremacist Threats, 
Critics Say,” The Washington Post, Sept. 2, 2017, , https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-govern-
ment-has-long-ignored-white-supremacist-threats-crit-
little to encourage goodwill between non-
Muslim Americans and their Muslim neighbors. 
Misinformation is also largely responsible 
for America’s international debacles and 
expansionist policies.17 
American strategic interests in the Middle East 
vary but are largely related to the energy sector. 
Keeping the region embroiled in conflict and 
relying upon tyrannical regimes are two of the 
ways that the United States has maintained 
its hegemonic presence. Indeed, US presence 
in the region is often disguised as a means of 
“promoting democracy” or “ensuring stability.” 
In both instances, Americans are led to believe 
that the Arab—often a Muslim—cannot ac-
complish either task alone. The notion of US 
presence as a civilizing force in the region is one 
that was exposed by the late Edward W. Said in 
his famous book, Orientalism.18 Said elucidates 
the prism through which the Western world 
has viewed the Near East, or the Orient. Histor-
ically, this was done through depictions of the 
region and its inhabitants as strange, wealthy, 
and mystical—something of fables. Consider 
the historical image of the Arab as magical, 
which has been transformed to the Arab as 
monster, a being so ruthless, that he or she is 
worthy of punishment abroad and exclusion at 
home. While these images continue to circu-
late in the mainstream media—both conserva-
tive and liberal outlets promote these images 
and therefore legitimize the stereotypes.19 Elite 
self-interest continues to trump reality. 
5. Conclusion
Our analysis of the multifaceted causal mech-
anisms of Islamophobia has been a topical 
one. Considerable work on this subject has 
emerged in the years since the 9/11 attacks. 




17. See, for example, Jonathan Stein and Tim Dickinson, “Lie 
by Lie: A Timeline of How We Got into Iraq,” Mother Jones, 
Sept. 2006, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/12/
leadup-iraq-war-timeline/.
18. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 
1978).
19. See, for example, Khaled Beydoun, “US Liberal Is-
lamophobia is Rising—and More Insidious than Right 
Wing Bigotry,” The Guardian, May 26, 2018, https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/26/us-liber-
al-islamophobia-rising-more-insidious.
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understanding this new manifestation of an 
old prejudice—an animus directed at a racial 
and religious minority group. However, to our 
knowledge, there exists no attempt to view 
the hatred of Muslims, or those mistaken 
for Muslims, in an integrated approach. The 
complexity of Islamophobia demands a theo-
retically grounded, multifaceted explanation. 
Considering the issues dealt with here, from 
sociological, psychological, economic, and co-
lonial perspectives, we hope to bring attention 
to the myriad ways that students, scholars, and 
activists can begin to envision and decipher 
the complexities pertaining to Islamophobia, 
and to critique the structures that give rise to it 
as well as other forms of prejudice. Beyond the 
academic discourse on contested definitions, 
Islamophobia must be understood, at its core, 
as hatred and/or fear of Muslims, as well as an 
attempt to exclude them from public life. We 
hope that others will engage in discussion of 
its causes, as well as of ways to ameliorate the 
collateral consequences of its existence. 
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This paper discusses the path, along with the 
hurdles, towards an expanded understanding 
of Islamophobia. Although operationalization 
of the term is challenging, the authors ad-
mittedly noted the numerous difficulties for 
constructing such a comprehensive operation-
alization. Nevertheless, the main contribution 
of the paper is to foster a scholarly dialogue 
as to what Islamophobia entails. Given our 
current political/social/economic situation, the 
relevance of the paper is spot on. Since the mi-
croscope has been placed on the behaviors of 
Muslims, mostly toward negative ends, this pa-
per counters the widespread narrative by pre-
senting Muslims as victims in many cases. The 
double standards are also highlighted in the 
contrast between terrorist cases perpetrated 
by non-Muslim individuals and those terrorist 
acts committed by Muslims. Namely, the Las 
Vegas shooter’s brain was examined hinting at 
a possible mental illness which would explain 
his behavior, the discussion of white privilege 
is lost in the discussion among popular dis-
course. This is especially relevant considering 
the recent white supremacist terrorist attack 
of a mosque in New Zealand. Furthermore, the 
topic of Islamophobia is also accessible in the 
sense that much of the political spotlight cur-
rently in America, China, Myanmar, and Europe 
focuses on minorities who are deemed the 
other by political establishments and elites. In 
terms of intellectual coherence, namely theo-
retical, I appreciate the inclusion of sociological 
and psychological paradigms and references 
to the Freudian concept of the “uncanny,” 
as well as Edward Said’s contributions to the 
study of Muslims. In conclusion, this article 
engages a myriad of perspectives including 
the psychological, sociological, economic, and 
political in a robust interdisciplinary approach 
to the operationalization of Islamophobia. 
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